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SELF HELP GROUPS AND EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN 
 SELF-SELECTION OR ACTUAL BENEFITS? 
 
Abstract 
Evidence on success of SHGs in empowering females is mixed. In particular, researchers 
argue that such schemes often attract women who are already active in the public domain 
(referred to as ‘self-selection’), so that those who are most in need of assistance remain 
excluded.  Simultaneously,  the  fact  that  a  majority  of  the  SHG  members  are  already 
empowered leads to exaggerated estimates of the effects of the program (called ‘program 
effects’). This paper attempts to test the significance of the program effect of SHGs by 
comparing empowerment levels of newly inducted and older members of SHGs. The 
paper is based on a survey conducted in six municipalities in West Bengal, India. 
 






Self Help Groups (SHGs) are informal associations consisting of 10-20 members created 
for  the  purpose  of  enabling  members  to  reap  economic  benefit  out  of  mutual  help, 
solidarity, and joint responsibility. The group-based approach enables poor women to 
accumulate capital by way of small savings and facilitates their access to formal credit 
facilities (Shylendra, 1998). The concept of joint liability embedded in the SHG enables 
the members to overcome the problem of collateral security, a major barrier to obtaining 
credit from formal institutions. It also leads to peer monitoring, that improves the rate of 
loan recoveries (Stiglitz, 1993). Finally, some of the basic characteristics of SHGs, like 
small size of memberships and homogeneity of composition, bring about cohesiveness 
and effective participation of members in the functioning of the group (Fernandez, 1994). 
 
Although  policy  makers and  NGOs  view  SHGs as  instruments  of  change  and  socio-
economic empowerment, the actual evidence on the success of SHGs is mixed. It has  
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been pointed out that the complex gender relations prevailing within the household and 
the  strength  of  patriarchy  within  the  community  determines  the  ability  of  SHGs  to 
transform the lives of its members (Kabeer, 1998, Rahman, 1999). Another issue that has 
been  raised  in  recent  years  is  that,  in  order  to  achieve  immediate  success  and  attain 
quantitative  targets,  women  from  non-poor  households,  or  those  active  in  the  public 
domain, are targeted in such programs. While this results in high rates of attainments, this 
may also artificially inflate success of the program. 
 
In this paper, we address this issue. Based on a study of beneficiaries of the Swarna 
Jayanti Sahari Swarojgar Yojana, an important poverty alleviation scheme for urban slum 
dwellers in India, this paper examines whether the group-based micro-credit program has 
been able to empower women and improve their functional capabilities significantly. In 
particular, we examine the hypothesis that the self-selection mechanism is a major cause 
underlying the apparent success of SHGs in empowering members. That is, we examine 
whether women become empowered after joining SHGs, or whether it is women who are 
already empowered who join SHGs. 
 
The scheme of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the literature on 
SHGs. This is followed by a discussion of methodological issues related to the question 
raised in the paper (Section 3). The findings are discussed in Section 4, followed by a 
concluding section that summarizes the results and discusses their implications. 
 
2. Literature Survey  
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NGOs and policy makers are the greatest advocates of SHGs. Although - relying mainly 
on anecdotal evidence - they have argued that micro-credit programs have empowered 
beneficiaries substantially they have failed to offer any conclusive statistical evidence in 
this regard. While there is a vast body of work in this area, given the complexities in 
defining and measuring empowerment, the evidence in this regard is  mixed (Hunt & 
Kasynathan, 2002).  
 
2.1 Positive Outcomes from SHG movement 
Some researchers have observed positive outcomes being generated by participation in 
SHG activities. Mayoux (2000) points out that the use of savings and credit for economic 
activities generates income and assets. This leads to increase in consumption standards 
(Rahman  1986)  and,  more  importantly,  reduces  vulnerability  of  poor  households  by 
reducing smoothening seasonal fluctuations in household income and consumption levels 
(Zaman 2001). The additional income may also act as a safety net by helping the family 
tide over emergencies (ESCAP, 2002). 
 
Participation in SHG movements and access to credit also leads to a change in the status 
of members within their households. It has been observed that the economic contribution 
of women may increase their role in household decision-making (Hashemi et al., 1996, 
Mayoux, 2000, Pitt and Khandker, 1995). This may lead to improved household-level 
outcomes  with  respect  to  health,  education  (particularly  education  of  the  girl  child, 
nutrition and family planning (Hashemi et al., 1996, Hulme and Mosley, 1997, Kabeer, 




Other positive outcomes of joining SHGS have been observed – greater respect within 
household (FAO, 2002; Mayoux, 2000), increase in mobility, ability to articulate, self-
confidence  and  esteem  (Dollard  et  al..,  2006;  FAO,  2002;  Hashemi  et  al.,  1996; 
Krishnaraj and Kay 2002; Putnam 2000), growth of a collective identity (Larence, 2001) 
and political awareness (Hashemi et al., 1996). The incidence of violence against women 
has also been found to have decreased (Hashemi et al., 1996, Schuler et al., 1996).  
 
2.2 Limitations of SHGs 
These optimistic findings about SHGs have been questioned by other researchers. An 
important issue that has been raised by researchers relate to the extent to which women 
are able to retain loans and use them for economic activities (Goetz and Sengupta, 1996, 
Mayoux, 1998). Kabeer (1998) points out that structural, individual and program factors 
are  crucial  in  this  respect.  It  has  been  argued  that  patriarchal  features  of  the  local 
community and the absence of local investment opportunities limit the extent to which 
women are able to use the loan. As a result they often serve as ‘post boxes’, subsequently 
transferring  loans  received  to  their  husbands  or  male  relatives.  Goetz  and  Sengupta 
(1996) reported that only about a third of women recipients in Bangladesh were able to 
hold on to their loans; Montogomery and Hulme (1996) found this proportion to be even 
lower among first time borrowers in Bangladesh (only 9%). 
 
Rahman (1999) points out that access to microfinance may increase the vulnerability and 
insecurity of the family. A study by ILO (2004) emphasizes on the considerable social  
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pressure brought upon borrowers to repay their loans. This leads to increased tension to 
within the household (Gibbons, 1999, Goetz and Sengupta, 1996), particularly as women 
often depend on their husbands or male relatives to help in repayment (Matin and Rab, 
1997). This often leads to escalation of domestic violence – a study by Rahman (1999) 
found an increase in violence in 70% of the survey households. 
 
A third problem relates to the allocation of work hours. Since patriarchy demands that 
women complete their household chores, we found during our survey that SHG members 
generally sacrifice their leisure hours to undertake SHG activities in the afternoon and 
evenings. This leads to over-work, fatigue and even malnutrition (Ackerly, 1995).  
 
Another  issue,  hotly  contested  by  NGO  staff  and  donors,  relates  to  the  targeting  of 
beneficiaries. Hulme (2000), Kabeer (1998) and Morduch (1998), for instance, found that 
introduction  of  SHGs  in  a  region  did  improve  income  levels,  but  not  of  the  poorer 
households. The focus on ensuring high repayment rates often leads to the exclusion of 
those households who are perceived as being poor credit risks - the poorest and neediest 
(Hulme and Mosley 1996; Montgomery 1996; Noponan 1990, Krishnaraj and Kay 2002 
and  FAO  2002).  In  fact,  in  some  cases,  entry  of  large  organizations  has  led  to  the 
squeezing out of smaller organizations with a record of successfully targeting the poorer 
households (Arn and Lily 1992; Ebdon 1994). 
 
A  somewhat  related  issue  is  that  of  self-selection.  Given  that  enrolment  in  SHGs  is 
voluntary,  self-selection  emerges  as  an  important  issue.  Self-selection  occurs  when  
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members of a group have a pre-disposition to choose certain outcomes. Since women 
have the choice to join a SHG or not, the movement is more likely to attract women who 
are already economically active, or are more empowered than others. In this case, for 
instance, ‘empowered’  women will join DWCUA members, while those who are not 
‘empowered’ are less likely to join such groups. Comparing empowerment levels in such 
cases will lead to the mistaken conclusion that joining DWCUAs increases empowerment 
levels, when the correct conclusion would have been that empowered women have joined 
DWCUAs. As Steele et al. (1998) point out: 
“Thus, high levels of empowerment among group members cannot be attributed 
to  the  program  alone  without  controlling  for  the  likelihood  of  selection  bias. 
Clearly, analyses that do not allow for self-selection tend to lead to estimates that 
overstate program impact. Although several studies have attempted to evaluate 
the effects of credit-program participation on reproductive and other behaviors, 
relatively few have addressed the issue of self-selection satisfactorily” (Steele et 
al., 1998: 14). 
This issue forms the focus of our paper. In the next section, we shall discuss how the self-
selection issue has been considered in literature, and how we propose to treat it. 
 
3. Methodological Issues 
The methodological issues - relating to identification of empowerment indicators, choice 
of control group, site selection and statistical tests - are discussed below.  
 
3.1 Indicators of Empowerment  
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In this paper we try to identify some key factors that increase the ability of the target 
group  to  make  choices  and  the  power  to  transform  these  choices  into  actions  and 
outcomes, keeping in mind their unique socio-economic situation. Based upon the survey 
of literature (Section 2.1), we argue that this boils down to five indicators: 
a)  Identity of the person controlling income earned from SHG activities: Part of 
the  surplus  earned  from  SHG  activities  is  periodically  distributed  among 
members. If the respondent controls this income then this will provide her with 
some  degree  of  financial  autonomy.  Her  sense  of  contributing  to  the  family 
(perceived  contribution  response)  increases  and  her  fall-back  position  will 
improve. This will help her in bargaining for intra-household resources. 
b)  Tolerance  of  domestic  violence:  Researchers  have  observed  that  domestic 
violence  may  be  a  common  tool  employed  by  husbands  to  reinforce  their 
authority within the domain of the household (Heise et al., 1999). The reluctance 
of women to oppose such violence and tolerate it in silence has also been well 
documented (Bennet and Menderson, 2003). Part of the reason is her poor fall-
back position. Participation in SHGs reduces her tolerance of domestic violence 
not only by empowering her economically but also by increasing her awareness. 
Now an important problem in studying violence against women (VAW) is the 
reluctance of women to report or even discuss such issues. We therefore placed 
some specific contexts before the respondent and asked her whether she felt VAW 
to be justified in each of the cases. 
c)  Household decision-making: Increased command over financial resources also 
improves her participation in household decision-making. This may be reflected  
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in  a  greater  say  in  matters  like:  daily  purchases,  major  purchases,  increased 
mobility (manifested in ability to visit maternal home, relatives and friends, fairs 
and markets), use of contraceptives and her own health seeking behavior. 
d)  Improved status within family: As the SHG members augment family income, 
smoothens  income  and  consumption  streams  and  help  to  tide  over  crisis,  the 
family members acknowledge her contribution by according her greater respect. 
e)  Aspirations for the girl child: The process of empowerment leads to a ‘virtuous 
cycle’ with an increase in aspiration, not only for her own self, but also for other 
females in the future generation. Typically, this may be reflected in a desire to 
educate  her  daughter  equally  with  her  sons  and  allow  her  to  seek  gainful 
employment, though within limits. 
Given these indicators of empowerment, the question is how to measure the impact of 
SHGs on empowerment. 
 
3.2 Self-Selection and Choice of Control Group  
As mentioned earlier it is necessary to distinguish between two effects – what may be 
called the program effect (what we want to measure) and what may be called the self-
selection effect (leading to biased over-estimates during evaluation) - in evaluating the 
success  of  programs  based  on  voluntary  participation.  The  best  method  for  doing  so 
would be to use longitudinal data but the cost and time involved is substantial. As a 
result, this method is not practical. In such cases, a quasi-experimental panel design may 
be used to incorporating ‘before and after’ information as in Amin et al. (1995), Schuler 
and Hashemi (1994), Steele et al.. (1998) and Rahman and DaVanzo (1997). Since the  
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survey is undertaken after the program introduction, the ‘before’ information is based on 
recall. Unless the time interval is short, a recall bias may occur. Finally, two-stage models 
may be used to control for self-selection bias (Maddala, 1983) as in Pitt et al. (1995) to 
evaluate the effect of three group-based credit programs on current contraceptive use and 
fertility in Bangladesh. The problem with the two-stage model approach is that it requires 
restrictions that are hard to satisfy.  
 
In this paper, we have controlled for self-selection by collecting information on when the 
respondent joined the SHG. This information was used to divide respondents into two 
groups – newly inducted members (those who had joined SHGs within six months) and 
‘older’  members.  If  we  assume  that  only  the  program  effect  operates,  then  newly 
inducted  members  should  either  not  be  empowered,  or  have  lower  levels  of 
empowerment, while older members are empowered. On the other hand, if self-selection 
is present, then the empowerment levels of both groups will not differ substantially. The 
problem then becomes of measuring empowerment levels of newly inducted and older 
DWCUA members and testing to see whether there is a significant difference in their 
empowerment levels. This method has the advantage that it avoids the issue of recall. 
 
3.3 Selection of Survey Sites 
The findings of this paper are based on six municipalities - Kaliagunj (Uttar Dinajpur), 
Old  Maldah  (Maldah),  Barrackpore  (North  24  Parganas),  Chandannagar  (Hooghly), 
Burdwan (Burdwan) and Gayeshpur (Nadia). The specific municipalities were suggested 
by the State Urban Development Agency (SUDA), the agency implementing the scheme  
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at the state-level, on the grounds that the process of forming DWCUAs was particularly 
successful  in  these  municipalities.  Discussion  with  officials  (both  of  SUDA  and 
municipalities)  revealed  that  the  main  parameters  for  considering  SHG  groups  to  be 
successful were stable membership, ability of members to repay loans taken from the 
revolving fund, ability of the group to repay the subsidized bank loan and generation of a 
steady surplus from SHG activities.  
Table 1: Statistics Relating to ULBs Surveyed 
Some important statistics relating to the survey sites are given in Table 1. We should also 
note differences in the economic characteristics of the municipalities. Three of the sites 
have strong links to the agricultural sector – of which Burdwan is located in a developed 
and prosperous agricultural hinterland, while Kaliagunj and Old Maldah are agro-based 
but underdeveloped towns. Barrackpore and Gayeshpur are industrial towns. Barrackpore 
was once an important  industrial area; over time the decline of the jute industry has 
eroded  its  economic  importance.  However,  its  proximity  to  the  metropolitan  city  of 
Kolkata  and  its  well  developed  educational  infrastructure  has  resulted  in  a  relatively 
educated  population.  Gayeshpur,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  satellite  of  the  industrial 
township  of  Kalyani.  It is  relatively  under-developed.  However,  the success  of  some 
specific SHGs led us to study select this site. The last site, Chandannagar, was originally 
a French colony, set up in 1784. The proximity of Chandannagar to Kolkata and the 
transport links between the two cities has resulted in the growth of the service sector in 
this town. 
 
3.4 Statistical Method  
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Based on the indicators of empowerment discussed earlier we have constructed ‘scores’ 
of  empowerment,  corresponding  to  aspects  like  decision-making  power,  tolerance  for 
domestic violence, and so on. The scoring method is discussed below: 
1.  Control over respondents’ income: If respondent herself decides, a score of 1 is 
assigned; in case of joint control she is assigned a score of 0.5 and 0 if she does 
not have any control over income earned from SHG activities. 
2.  Household  Decision-making  power:  Respondent  as  sole  decision-maker  is 
coded as 1, joint decision-making as 0.5 and all other cases as 0.  
Issues  considered  were:  Who  spends  husbands’  income?  Who  decides  on 
treatment  of  respondent?  Who  decides  on  major  household  purchases?  Who 
decides  on  daily  purchases?  Who  decides  whether  respondent  may  visit  her 
maternal home? Who decides whether respondent may visit other relatives? Who 
decides whether respondent may go to distant fairs or markets? Who decides the 
vote of respondent? Who decides whether to use contraceptives? 
Individual  scores  for  each  component  were  aggregated  to  form  the  composite 
score for this indicator. 
3.  Opposition  to  domestic  violence:  Coded  as  1  if  respondent  did  not  support 
violence and as 0 if she felt that violence was justified in the specific context.
1 If 
respondent was uncertain, this was coded as 0.5. The contexts are given below:  
a.  Wife leaves home without permission 
b.  Wife does not look after child properly 
c.  Wife does not cook properly  
d.  Wife argues with husband  
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e.  Wife refuse to have sexual relations with husband 
f.  Husband suspects that wife has illicit relations 
g.  Wife does not behave properly with in-laws 
4.  Improvement in status within household: If respondent reported that she was 
accorded increased respect, she was assigned a score of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
5.  Aspiration for girl child: Responses to whether respondent wanted daughters to 
be educated equally with sons, whether daughters would be allowed to work, and 
whether they would be allowed to work in local retail shops were coded as 1 if her 
response was affirmative and 0 if negative. 
 
The mean and median scores for each of these aggregate indicators are estimated for new 
and old members respectively. We then test whether differences between these scores 
differ between the sub-groups. The choice of appropriate statistical method becomes an 
important issue here. Given the size of both sub-samples (45 new members and 195 old 
members), t-tests based on the assumption of a normal distribution may be applied. In 
addition,  we  have  also  employed  two  non-parametric  tests  –  the  Mann-Whitney  and 
Kruskall-Wallis tests. These methods have the added advantage that, while t-tests may be 
influenced by the ad hoc values of scores assigned, such considerations are irrelevant in 
rank based tests. 
 
This method, however, has a problem that it fails to control for socio-economic factors. 
We therefore follow up the two sample tests with a set of limited dependant regressions. 
Each of the empowerment indicators are regressed upon socio-economic variables that  
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are likely to influence empowerment levels (per capita income, household size, religion, 
caste, education of respondent and husband) and a dummy to distinguish between newly 
inducted and older members. If the coefficient of this dummy variable is insignificant, 
then the program effect can be ruled out. 
 
4. Findings   
Our  survey  revealed  that  SHG  members  were  involved  in  undertaking  activities  like 
selling garments, handicrafts, trading in rice, embroidery, tailoring, dairy farming, spice 
making, and other activities. Such activities yielded in a substantial income – consisting 
of  about  a  fifth  of  household  income.  However,  such  activities  were  not  uncommon 
before  the  introduction  of  the  program  in  the  survey  sites.  We  found  that  60%  of 
respondents had been engaged in economic activities before joining DWCUAs, though 
on a part time individual basis. The achievement of SHGs was that it injected capital into 
the  system,  mobilized  individual  activities  into  group-based  activity,  and  intensified 
participation in economic activities. While this reduced any potential source of conflict, 
the absence of any structural break may have also resulted in the program generating only 
economic  effects,  without  creating  a  capacity  to  transform  the  social  life  of  the 
community. 
 
4.1 Levels of Empowerment 
Our survey revealed that almost half of the respondents decide on how to spend their own 
income, while about 30% make this decision jointly with their husbands. This would 
imply that 80% of respondents have at least some control over their income, which is  
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very  encouraging.  Proportion  of  respondents  with  control  over  family  income, 
expectedly, is lower - 60% of respondents reported that that they had some control over 
their husband’s income.  
 
It can be seen that less than a third of respondents have sole control over household 
decisions like health-care seeking behaviour, major purchases, visiting maternal home, or 
relatives, and going to distant fairs (Table 2). Control of respondents is markedly lacking 
with  respect  to  family  planning  issues  like  contraceptive  use  –  only  one  out  of  ten 
respondents exercise this decision on their own. In roughly 30-40% cases, the husband 
takes  these  decisions  himself.  The  only  exceptions  are  with  respect  to  exercise  of 
electoral rights and daily purchases. Further, if we compare the figures for our entire 
sample and the sub-group who are married and live with their husbands, it may be seen 
that an even smaller proportion of respondents have full control over decisions in most 
cases. 
Table 2: Identity of decision-maker in household decisions  
While it may be argued that the adoption of birth control measures is a decision that 
should be taken jointly,
2 the limited autonomy of women in most of the other decision-
making spheres challenges the popular notion that engagement in market activities will 
enhance the ability to influence household outcomes. In particular, the inability to take 
mobility-related  decisions  (visiting  maternal  home,  relatives,  fairs)  and  health  care 
decisions should be a matter of concern for policy makers.  
 
Of course, the large proportion of respondents with some say in decisions may be taken 
as an indicator of change – while previously, the respondents might not have had any say,  
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now they may have at least some say. Given the absence of information on the change in 
decision-making power, however, this hypothesis cannot be tested. 
 
It can be seen that the tolerance of respondents vary widely with respect to the specific 
context of violence. Respondents feel that beating of wives is justified if women do not 
behave  properly  with  their  in-laws  (40%),  if  women  have  illicit  relations  (35%),  if 
women argue with their husbands (28%), if women do not cook properly and if women 
do not look after their children (21%) (Table 3). This is interesting as all these situations 
involve  norms  of  the  patriarchal  family,  where  the  women  have the  responsibility  to 
provide care services to family members. A surprisingly large proportion of respondents 
do  not  support  violence  if  the  wife  refuses  to  have  sexual  relations.  This  attitude  is 
justified  by  respondents  on  the  grounds  that  a  refusal  to  have  intercourse  with  the 
husband is not a ‘normal practice’ and may be due to a sexual problem with the husband. 
Table 3: Tolerance of domestic violence in specific contexts 
About  75%  of  respondents  reported  that  they  were  treated  with  greater  respect  and 
accorded  more  importance  by  their  household  members  after  joining  DWCUAs. 
Appreciation of the fact that respondents were contributing to household welfare was the 
most  common  reason  for  increase  in  status  within  the  households  (69%).  Another 
important reason was increase in self-respect of respondents (14%).
3 
 
The survey also found that a substantial majority of respondents wanted to educate their 
daughters as much as their sons (90% of respondents), and wanted their daughters to 
work (86%). However, there were restrictions on the place of work. When the question  
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“Will  you  allow  your  daughter  to  work?”  was  rephrased  as  “Will  you  allow  your 
daughter  to  work  in  a  shop?”,  the  proportion  of  respondents  expressing  reluctance 
increased sharply from 10% to 48%.  
 
The  analysis  of  motives  for  educating  daughters  revealed  that  the  desire  to  ensure 
economic independence (cited in 38% cases) dominates other motives, followed by the 
desire  to  ensure  self-respect  (21%),  improve  marriage  prospect  (13%)  and  ability  to 
educate her child (12%). While the first two may be identified to be positively correlated 
with empowerment, the substantial presence of the latter two motives would indicate the 
persistence of traditional patriarchal values. 
 
Now this discussion does not distinguish between the self-selection and program effect. 
In the next section, therefore, we turn to this issue and try to nullify the self-selection 
effect.  
 
4.2 Is Selection Mechanism at Work? 
As  discussed  in  Section  3,  one  way  of  doing  so  is  to  compare  empowerment  scores 
between old and new SHG members. Table 4 reports the results of this comparison. It can 
be seen that such differences are significant only in two cases – opposition to domestic 
violence and improvement in status within household. The results are similar for all the 
three tests. 




4.3 A Disaggregative Analysis 
Since the household decision-making and tolerance for domestic violence are based on 
aggregation of individual scores, it is necessary to analyse these two indicators carefully. 
Therefore, the method used above is applied on the individual components that make up 
these two scores. 
 
In  the  case  of  household  decision-making  differences  between  scores  are  statistically 
insignificant in all cases (Table 5). This is consistent with the finding that differences in 
the aggregate score for empowerment between old and new DWCUAs were statistically 
insignificant. 
Table 5: Differences in Decision-making between Old and New Members 
It  can  be  seen  (Table  6)  that  there  is  a  significant  difference  in  tolerance  towards 
domestic violence only in the contexts of wife not cooking properly, or not caring for her 
child, or arguing with her husband. At the 10% level, difference in scores in the case of 
“wife does not behave properly with in-laws” is also statistically significant. This may 
indicate  that  older  members  appreciate  the  fact  that  their  involvement  in  economic 
activities may affect household tasks, like child care and cooking, and has to be accepted 
as an inevitable cost of their efforts to augment family income. The greater perceived 
contribution to the household may also have encouraged them to challenge the authority 
of the husband and argue with him.  
Table 6: Differences in Opposition to Violence between Old and New Members  
 
4.4 Regression Analysis  
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The results do not show any substantial program effects. This is further confirmed if we 
control for socio-economic and personal factors.  
 
It can be seen (Table 7) that the coefficient of the dummy variable for members with 
more than six months experience is significant only in the regressions for ‘Improved 
status of respondents’ and – at a 10% level of significance - “Opposition to domestic 
violence’. This implies that, although women are empowered to some extent in the study 
sites, this cannot be attributed to the program effect. Their earlier history of participation 
in  part-time  economic  activities  had  possibly  empowered  a  large  proportion  of  the 
respondents; as a result, when the SHG movement started in these areas, these members 
joined  readily.  The  possibility  that  these  members  may  have  been  (consciously  or 
unconsciously) pre-selected by municipality officials and councilors during the process of 
identifying possible SHG members also cannot be ruled out.  
Table 7: Summary of Regression Results 
Our survey  revealed that the increase in status of respondents is attributed mainly to 
recognition of their contribution to family income. The income from SHG activities is 
substantial, and comprises a fifth of household income on average. More important than 
the quantitative contribution, is how this income is used. Given that more than a third of 
respondents  were  exposed  to  sharp  seasonal  fluctuations  in  income  (and  hence 
consumption), a major contribution of income from SHG activities was to smoothen such 
income  and  consumptions  fluctuations.  It  was  also  reported  that  this  income  had  an 
important role in reducing drop outs from schooling due to an inability to pay session 




The  other  mechanism  underlying  an  improvement  in  status  within  household  is  the 
increase  in  self-respect  that  participation  in  SHG  activities  breeds.  Discussion  with 
respondents  revealed  that  interaction  with  other  women,  undertaking  economic 
transactions  (when  buying  inputs  or  selling  products),  visiting  local  markets  and 
interacting  with  municipality  officials  in  the  Poverty  Eradication  Cell  were  the  main 
channels through which their self-respect and confidence was enhanced. These factors are 
also important in increasing the ability to protest against domestic violence. 
 
5. Conclusion 
To sum up, the emphasis on ensuring the success of the group and attain targets set for 
the formation of SHGs may have led municipality officials to target women who are 
more likely to repay loans, or those who already participate in economic activities and are 
empowered  to  some  extent.  This  creates  difficulties  in  assessing  the  success  of  such 
schemes. This problem has been observed by other researchers on SHGs who have tried 
to  disentangle  the  self-selection  and  program  effects  while  evaluating  SHG  programs 
using alternative methods. In this paper we compare between empowerment levels of 
newly inducted and older members and test for differences in their empowerment levels 
using non-parametric methods. This is followed by an econometric analysis where socio-
economic variables are additionally incorporated as control variables while continuing to 
test for this difference. This method has the advantage that it avoids the problem of recall 
and  is  less  time  consuming  and  cost  effective.  However,  one  type  of  self-selection 
problem remains. Since we are undertaking a mid-point evaluation of the scheme, we  
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cannot rule out the possibility that already empowered women join at the start of the 
program, while less empowered women or those not empowered at all join gradually. 
However, this has been tackled to some extent by undertaking surveys at multiple sites 
where the program has been introduced at different time points.  
 
Our results indicate that program effects operated only to reduce tolerance of domestic 
violence and enhance status of members within the household. While these are important 
gains, the overall failure of the SHGs to empower women needs consideration. We had 
noted earlier that the scheme had not introduced any new form of activity but had simply 
enabled economic activities previously undertaken on an individual and part-time basis to 
be  undertaken  with  greater  labour  and  capital  resources  on  a  systematic  basis.  Thus, 
instead of creating structural breaks, SHGs, more often than not, simply elevated the 
intensity of traditional part-time economic activities. This was acceptable to men for two 
reasons - income from such activity supplemented their meager family income and acted 
as a buffer during seasonal crisis, and such activities were undertaken in the afternoon 
and  evenings  so  that  they  involved  a  diversion  of  leisure  time  and  did  not  affect 
household chores. Any empowerment that challenged patriarchal structures was viewed 
as a necessary cost that was more than offset by the considerable economic gains from 
involvement in SHGs. This had the effect of reducing potential sources of conflict with a 
patriarchal community. On one hand, it facilitated the attainment of targets for number of 
SHGs  established;  on  the  other  hand,  it  ensured  success  of  groups  in  terms  of  the 
economic  parameters  used  by  officials  to  measure  success.  The  failure  to  challenge  
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traditional social structures and disengagement with the process of setting up of SHGs, 
however, remains a hurdle to a broader level of empowerment for the women involved. 
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END NOTES 
1 As a matter of fact, it should be intolerance of domestic violence. However, tolerance makes easy reading. 
2 We found that 70% of relevant respondents decided on adopting birth control measures jointly. Note that 
we simply asked whether the decision to adopt family planning was taken by respondent, her husband or 
jointly – we did not probe about precise method used as the women were reluctant to reveal such details. 
3  This  may  be  similar  to  what  is  called  perceived  interest  response.  The  increase  in  self  respect  of 
respondents makes them feel that their welfare should also be considered when allocating resources to 
maximize household welfare.   1 
Table 1: Statistics Relating to ULBs Surveyed 
Urban Local 
Body 
































Barrackpore  North 24 
Paraganas 
37  1916  11.65  144411  4459  3.1  2593  58.2  17535  12.1 
Burdwan  Burdwan  34  1865  48  285871  59719  20.9  29935  50.1  70064  24.5 
Chandannagar  Hooghly  41  1955  20  162166  42894  26.5  20020  46.7  22417  13.8 
Gayeshpur  Nadia  18  1995  23  55028  14283  26.0  6844  47.9  17239  31.3 
Kaliaganj  Uttar 
Dinajpur 
17  1987  8.99  47639  15600  32.7  14965  -  23789  49.9 
Old Maldah  Maldah  38  1869  9.58  62944  41880  66.5  3439  -  32441  51.5 
Sources: State Urban Development Agency, communication dated 15 October 2009.Figures for Kaliagunj and Old Maldah obtained from TPO. 
West Bengal Municipal Development Authority Webpage.  
General Statistics: http://wbdma.gov.in/htm/Ma_4_2_muni%20Catagory_Tab-2.htm; 
Slum Population. http://wbdma.gov.in/htm/Total%20Number%20of%20Slum.htm  
"Census  of  India  2001:  Data  from  the  2001  Census,  including  cities,  villages  and  towns  (Provisional)".  Census  Commission  of  India.  Archived 
from http://web.archive.org/web/20040616075334/http://www.censusindia.net/results/town.php?stad=A&state5=999; accessed on 2004-06-1.   2 
Table 2: Identity of decision-maker in household decisions  
Decisions  Respondent  Joint  Husband 
 Respondent's treatment  20.9  35.3  43.8 
 Major household purchase  16.8  46.2  37.1 
 Daily household purchase  44.8  23.4  31.8 
 Visit to maternal home  23.1  34.9  42.1 
 Visiting relatives' house  22.2  38.4  39.4 
 Whom to vote for  65.8  14.6  19.6 
 Use of contraceptives  10.0  69.5  20.5 
 Going to distant fair and markets  15.4  43.4  41.1 
 
 
Table 3: Tolerance of domestic violence in specific contexts 
Situation(Context)  Tolerant  Uncertain   Does not Support 
Wife leaves home without permission   13.3  6.3  80.4 
Wife does not look after child properly  20.8  7.5  71.7 
Wife does not cook properly  21.7  8.3  70.0 
Wife argues with husband  27.9  10.0  62.1 
Refuses to have sexual relations  14.2  17.9  67.9 
Husband suspects that wife has illicit 
relations 
34.6  9.2  56.3 
Wife does not behave properly with in-
laws 
40.4  7.1  52.5 
 
 
   3 
Table 4: Differences in Empowerment Indicators between Old and New Members 
Mean  Median  Scores 
New  Old  New  Old 





Control over respondent's income  1.79  1.92  1.000  0.500  -0.487    2062.0    0.904 
Household Decisions  6.071  4.819  6.50  5.00  1.435      330.5                                1.804 
Opposition to domestic violence  4.133  5.026  4.00  6.00  -2.55**  3097**  9.9** 
Improvement in status of member  0.65  0.86  1.00  1.00  -2.99**  2263**  8.65** 
Aspiration for girl children  2.222  2.405  2.00  3.00  -1.448   3780.5    2.574 
Note:   Levene’s test has been used to test for equality of variances. Based on the results, the appropriate 
t-statistic has been calculated. 
  Statistics  significant  at  5%  and  10%  level  have  been  indicated  by  asterisks  (**  and  *, 
respectively). 
 
Table 5: Differences in Decision-making between Old and New Members 
Mean  Median  Decision 
New  Old  New  Old 
t value  U  H 
Control of family income  0.387  0.373  0.500  0.500  0.211  2469.5  0.01 
Respondent's treatment  0.455  0.405  0.500  0.500  0.727  4003  0.474 
Major household purchase  0.44  0.396  0.500  0.500  0.689  3797  0.403 
Daily household purchase  0.605  0.549  1.000  0.500  0.742  3861  0.679 
Visit to maternal home  0.474  0.439  0.500  0.500  0.479  3111.5  0.188 
Visiting relative's house  0.488  0.437  0.500  0.500  0.724  3674  0.434 
Whom to vote for  0.702  0.77  1.000  1.000  -1.008  3714.5  0.857 
Use of contraceptives  0.379  0.462  0.500  0.500  -1.600  2216.5  2.589 
Going to distant fair and markets  0.412  0.417  0.500  0.500  -0.073  2932.5  0.02   4 
Table 6: Differences in Opposition to Violence between Old and New Members  
Mean  Median  Context 
New  Old  New  Old 
t value  U  H 
Wife leaves home without 
permission  
0.778  0.849  1.00  1.00  -1.12  4009  1.703 
Wife does not look after child 
properly 
0.622  0.769  1.00  1.00  -2.16**  3565.5**  5.933** 
Wife does not cook properly  0.644  0.779  1.00  1.00  -2.01**  3609.5**  5.518** 
Wife argues with husband  0.533  0.703  0.50  1.00  -2.33**  3458**  6.643** 
Refuses to have sexual relations  0.722  0.779  1.00  1.00  -0.947  3867.5  2.263 
Husband suspects that wife has 
illicit relations 
0.522  0.628  0.50  1.00  -1.381  3816.5  2.372 
Wife does not behave properly 
with in-laws 
0.444  0.587  0.50  1.00  -1.92*  3667.5*  3.729* 
Statistics significant at 5% and 10% level have been indicated by asterisks (** and *, respectively).   5 























Religion    Positive**  Positive**  Positive**  Positive** 
Caste           
Household 
size 
Negative*      Positive*   
Income        Positive**   
Age    Positive*       
Education  of 
respondent 
         
Education  of 
husband 
Positive**  Positive**      Positive* 
Dummy  for 
Old Member 
    Positive*  Positive**   
R
2 (pseudo)  0.06  0.18  0.07  0.12  0.04 
F or χ
2  26.88**  4.17**  2.04**  22.98**  16.76** 
Note: Significance of coefficient at 5% level and 10% level are denoted by ** and *, respectively.  
 